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Abstract 
With the increasing system scale and complexity, safety analysis based on formal models has been widely used in the 
development of aircraft products. However, when many departments or suppliers participate in the joint development 
of safety models, lots of problems arise. For example, models are weakly matching; models are incorrect, incomplete 
or with low reusability and difficult to maintain. To solve these problems, a practical safety modeling methodology 
based on Altarica, which contains three phases like information collection, model construction and model V&V, is 
proposed to establish a more structured, systematic and efficiency way in this paper. Detailed processes and relevant 
constraints are declared for each phase. Meanwhile, to improve the model management, it’s also discussed how to use 
the shared database to enhance the model reusability and simplify the model modification. At last, a hydraulic system 
is taken as an example to show how to the safety modeling methodology in practical. 
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1. Introduction 
With the increasing system scale and complexity, safety analysis based on formal models is developed 
with more advanced model description capacity and automated analysis process, and has been highly 
accepted by safety-critical industries in different areas [1], such as aviation, railway transport and nuclear 
power, etc. However, with the wide use of formal models in the development of aircraft products, lots of 
problems on model construction, integration and management arise [2][3][4], especially when multiple 
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departments or suppliers participate within the process together. These problems could be summarized as 
follows. 
First of all, because of the lack of standard interface definition among different aircraft system models, 
models couldn’t be assembled in the process of the model integration, which leads to continuous iteration 
and sometimes even model reconstruction. Model reconstruction is a disruptive problem which means 
previous work wasted. Second, for the lack of unified modeling process and good modeling constraints, 
the correctness, consistency and completeness issues of Altarica models have emerged. For example, 
without consideration of the architecture and function characteristics during different phases and missions, 
many problems such as incomplete configuration, inconsistency between models and actual function 
process as well as incorrect failure propagation could be introduced. Meanwhile, the lack of modeling 
constraints leads to the bad model readability and disordered hierarchies, which highly increase the risk of 
introducing human errors. Finally, in the process of modeling complex systems, as the design updates and 
refines, the difficulty and workload to modify models are greatly increased. Therefore, it’s quite 
necessary to improve the ability of model maintenance and reuse. 
Well-defined modeling process and modeling constraints can guarantee the correctness and 
completeness of the models and ensure that models match with others. References [4] [5] introduce the 
modeling process of the electronic system, hydraulic system and transmission system, but not fully define 
the information that should be collected before modeling (such as system configuration in different 
phases), as well as the necessary constraints (such as the naming rules). A Shared model database can be 
used to increase reusability. Reference [6] proposes constructing the safety architecture model library to 
improve the efficiency of modeling, but it doesn’t specify the contents of the shared database and how to 
reduce the difficulty of modifying models with the help of shared database so as to improve the model 
management ability. 
In order to solve problems above, a whole safety modeling process, which contains three phases like 
information collection, model construction and model verification, is proposed in this paper first. The 
sub-processes of three phases are also specified as well as the modeling rules and constraints. Then, 
researches on shared-database construction are carried on to improve the model reusability and simplify 
model modification process. Finally, a case study on the hydraulic system is performed to show how to 
implement the modeling process. 
2. The Altarica language 
Altarica is a formal language developed by the computer science laboratory of Bordeaux jointly with 
industries partners [7]ˈand has been widely used in the aviation areas. The language is carried out by the 
tool Simfia™ EADS APSYS (for example) which provides a graphical interface to design models and 
allow analyzing them by different ways such as simulation, automatic generation of minimal cuts (i.e. 
shortest scenarios leading to the failure condition) or sequences (i.e. ordered cuts). 
AltaRica language is hierarchical and compositional. Each component is described by a mode 
automaton [8]. The basic unit to model a system component is called a “node” and is composed with three 
different parts: 1) the declaration of variables and events; 2) the definition of transitions; 3) the definition 
of assertions. 
Each component has a finite number of flow variables and state variables. Flow variables are the 
inputs and the outputs of the node: they are the links between the node and its environment. State 
variables are internal variables which are able to memorize current or previous functioning mode (for 
example, failure mode). In our models, these variables (flow and state) are either Boolean or enumerated. 
Then, each node owns also events which modify the value of state variables. These events are 
phenomenon such as a failure, a human action or a reaction to a change of one input value.  
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The transitions describe how the state variables are modified. They are written such as “G(s,v) |- E -
>s_” where G(s,v) is a Boolean condition on state s and input variables v, E is the event and s_ is the 
effect of the transition on state variables. If the condition G is true, then event E can be triggered and state 
variables are modified as described in s_. The assertions describe how output variables are constrained by 
the input and state variables. 
Failures are propagated via nodes by their inputs and outputs. Failures can also be propagated by 
synchronizations which simulate the failure of several components at the same time. Hierarchy of nodes 
can be used to model complex components and build the model of the global system. Once the global 
model is obtained, the AltaRica model allows analyzing failure condition. Different tools can calculate, 
for example, minimal cut sets or the occurrence rate of a failure condition. 
3. The modeling process 
Safety models are usually used to take safety assessment of identified risks or hazards which exist for 
reasons of endogenous and exogenous causes. Therefore, before describing the modelling process, we 
have to stress that identification of risks in a structured and systematic way is the basis of normalized, 
systematic and structured safety modelling process [9]. After finishing identification of risks or hazards, 
the modelling process could start. 
The modeling process contains three phase: information collection, model construction and model 
verification and validation. Each phase owns different sub-processes and relevant rules and constraints. 
3.1. Information collection 
3.1.1. Sub-process of information collection 
Complete information collection is quite necessary before constructing a model. Incomplete 
information would lead to an incorrect model, which means more efforts to modify the model later. In 
order to clearly specify the system design, we define the information collection process as shown in Fig.1. 
a) Specify the system architecture, external entities and external interfaces 
The system architecture, external entities and external interfaces should be specified first. The 
architecture is the basis for the model. External entities contain origin producers of model input, target 
consumers of system output, and other entities representing technological exchanges or measures with 
external environments. External entities could be used to specify model inputs and outputs. 
There exist three kinds of model inputs: (1) fluids like energy or supplied flows; (2) command and 
control flows issued by the operator or pilot; (3) configuration transmitted manually or automatically to 
the system and referring to the state of the architecture in different flight phases and missions. 
According to the hierarchical level of the modelling system, the model may be later used to be 
integrated into a much higher level model.  Meanwhile, the modelling system may have a quite high 
hierarchical level itself, which means it needs to assemble sub-system models (or supplier models) for 
this system. Therefore, in order to successfully assemble supplier models later, it’s necessary to specify 
the interfaces among different sub-models. The interface definition is declared in 3.1.2. 
b) Build the function tree to specify the functions and services to model 
Build the function tree, and specify the safety-relevant functions and services to model according to 
the aircraft FHA and system FHA results. The system architecture is hierarchical. In order to be 
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consistent with the hierarchical architecture, the system fiction should be hierarchical also, which could 
be reflected by the function tree.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Information collection process 
c) Specify system breakdown structure 
The function chains and relevant blocks/entities (blocks/entities refer to the subjects that output 
relevant functions which could be system, sub-system, components with different breakdown levels) 
could be determined after specifying the functions to model. Some entities could be regrouped to reach a 
proper level of precision. In order to build a hierarchical and readable model, the break down structure 
should be then specified. The division method of system breakdown structure is declared in 3.1.2. The 
regroupment and the structure should be validated by designers to ensure correctness. 
d) Analysis the functions and services to be modeled 
After Process c), internal functional analysis (such as building function flow diagrams) has to be 
prepared to identify all functional chains contributing to the functions. List the elementary functions and 
relevant entities contributing to the main functions, and the following information should be collected: 
x blocks / entities involved in the transmission of the elementary functions 
x for every blocks,  elementary input and output functions connected 
x for every output of an entity,  input elementary functions needed 
x relevant states of the inputs and outputs (failed or normal, etc.) 
x possible specific dependency polynomial concerning an output state 
x the physical states of the equipment-level entities (only the bottom-level entities must have physical 
states corresponding the failure modes themselves˅ 
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3.1.2. Rules and constraints 
This part declares the rules and constraints that should be focused on. 
a) Interface definition 
The integration of different supplier models into a higher level model would be failed if the supplier 
models own different interface types. Therefore, data transmitted between models shall have the same 
type and type family name, which should be determined as soon as possible, even in the aircraft-level 
design phase. The process principles could be summarized as follow: 
x Step 1: aircraft level function architecture is defined (definition of systems involved).The integrator 
can define all the interfaces in the document that gathers all the links {emitter / receiver / data 
transmitted} 
x Step 2: Emitter / Receiver / Integrator agree on type / family name and store it in another document. 
b) Model decomposition structure 
The decomposition structure could be useful to improve the readability and reduce human errors. A 
practical decomposition levels are shown in Fig.2. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Model decomposition level 
In the first level, the system and external entities could be defined. In the second level, the system is 
decomposed into subsystems and the function networks formed by sub-systems are defined. Meanwhile, 
all output functions of sub-systems could be integrated into the output block. In the third level, the 
subsystems, output blocks and external blocks of Level 2 could be decomposed to declare the functional 
entities composing the subsystems, the function groups contained by the output block of Level 2, etc. The 
graphical decomposition structure pattern is shown in Fig.3. 
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Fig. 3 Structured Model Pattern 
3.2. Model construction 
3.2.1. Sub-process of model construction 
After collection of information, it’s time to start model construction and build a hierarchical model like 
Fig.3. The model could be constructed from the top level to the bottom. The precise process is as follows. 
a) Build the top level model 
Top level model contains the system block, the external input and output blocks and the connection 
links among them. 
b) Build the second level model 
The second model contains the sub-system block, the output block and the connection links among 
them. 
c) Build the third level model 
The third level model contains not only the elementary block, the elementary input and output and the 
connection links among them, but also the output function blocks decomposed by the output block of 
Level 2. There are two ways to connect the elementary blocks as shown in 3.2.2.  
d) Edit the elementary block 
Edit the elementary block and specify its reliability data, input and outputs, and the polynomial logics.   
e) Create missions and phases 
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Create missions and phases to declare the architecture characteristics during different flight phases and 
missions.  
3.2.2. Rules and constraints 
a) Naming rules 
When the system model is made up of different sub-system models developed by different teams, 
naming rules must be unified. Each component / equipment / type /operator name should respect a 
dedicated nomenclature. For exampleˈeach component / equipment / type / operator might have the 
following kind of reference: 
E24CAL-0001-001-00-1 with digits definition as 
- 1: Project code (A320 : A320_AIRCRAFT) 
- 2-3 : ATA chapter / reference of the sub level system in the product breakdown 
- 4 : Item code (C : Component, E : Equipment, T: Type, O: Operator) 
- 5-6 : Partner code  
- 7-10: Sequence number 
- 11-13: Second sequence number 
- 14-15: Special code 
- 16 : version 
b) Polynomial connection of elementary blocks 
There are two ways to connect the elementary blocks with the main functions and services to be 
provided by the system as shown in Fig.4. 
x Connect according to the topological structuration of the functional network. Describe all elementary 
functional flows exchanged by the different entities, and identify those logical and functional chains 
constituting at the end the different contributions to the main service provided.  
x Connect according to system composition. Determine the elementary entities contributing to the main 
function, and connect these entities with functions issued from the supporting entities directly to the 
main entity. 
 
                  
Fig. 4 (a) Modelling according to the topological structuration; (b) Modelling according to the composition 
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3.3. Model verification and validation 
3.3.1. Sub-process of model V&V 
Model V&V is to ensure the correctness and completeness of models. 
a) Theoretical V&V 
V&V Checklists, FMEA/FTA/Reliability diagrams could be used to support V&V process. 
FMEA/FTA/Reliability diagrams could be used to check if the results are consistent with the previously 
known causes of failure conditions. V&V checklists should contain as many requirements as possible to 
guarantee the correctness and completeness as talked detailed in 3.3.2. 
b) Practical V&V 
Practical V&V is valid only if a physical model or real sample of the model can be used.  Practical 
V&V works through producing real failures on the real system, and check if there is a coherency between 
the real effects produced and those predicted by the FMECA generated from the model.  
3.3.2. Rules and constraints 
a) Theoretical V&V should contain contents like applicability, input requirements and means of 
compliance, model assumptions/limitations. 
Applicability could be verified through check the system baseline of configuration managements, 
referenced documents and system designs. These input requirements could be failure conditions 
probability, high level requirements, in service lessons learnt and interfaced system requirements. As to 
assumptions/limitations, one should check the correctness of model perimeter, abstraction level, behavior, 
etc. 
b) Practical V&V is valid only if a physical model or real sample of the model can be used. 
4. Model management 
For a complex system, the difficulty to maintain its model is huge. Especially along with the 
continuous updates of system design, the workload to refine models is hard to predict and there is a high 
possibility of introducing new errors in the modification process. Use of shared database to manage 
model is put forward to enhance management ability and decrease the difficulty of model modification. 
4.1. The structure of shared database 
A shared database could improve the model reusability and the efficiency of modelling. The shard 
database could store common information and integrated into the modelling tools. The database could 
contain the following sub-libraries.  
a) Safety architecture  pattern library 
Safety architecture pattern describe the pieces of architectures or micro-architectures widely used in 
the safety-critical systems [8], such as redundancy design. The properties of these micro-architectures are 
stored in the library. For example, for a double-redundant and cold-standby system, properties like a node 
within two blocks, internal and external inputs and outputs of the node, and transition relations between 
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two blocks, are defined in the library. When one has to build such a system, the work is only to call this 
node in library and assign these properties. 
b) Standard component library 
The failure modes of common electronic equipment, hydraulic equipment and standard mechanical 
parts are relatively fixed. Altarica nodes can be established for these components and stored in the 
Standard Component Library. 
c) Failure mode library 
Failure mode library is used to store common failure modes. The failure mode could be directly called 
in the process of describing Altarica nodes. The common failure modes include: leak, binding, error-input, 
no-input, short-circuit, open-circuit and so on.  Failure modes could be classified in accordance with the 
equipment type. 
d) Rules and limitation library 
Some rules and constraints about the models could be recorded in the rules and limitation library, such 
as unified naming rules and that equipment of Level 3 must have its own physical failure state. In the 
model V&V phase, these rules could be called to check the model automatically. 
4.2. Database call relationships 
In the process of shared database design, the call relationships of different libraries should be 
considered to further enhance the model reusability and improve the modelling efficiency. For example, 
when calling the standard component library, one can call failure mode library at the same time to add 
failure modes for the component node. When calling the redundancy architecture in the safety 
architecture pattern library, one can call the standard component library to instantiate the blocks in the 
architecture pattern. Fig.5 describes the call relationships. 
Failure mode library Standard component library Safety architecture pattern library
Break
Pump
Dual redundant cold backup
Add failure
modes
Instantiate
blocks
 
Fig. 5 Database call relationships   
4.3. Model update 
The shared database could be used to simplify the model update. Before constructing the model, a 
special shared database should be established for the project. And then, the model could be established 
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based on the special database. When the parameters of equipment changes, one only need to update the 
relevant information in the database, and then the whole model could follow the update.  
5. Case study 
The modelling process is applied to a hydraulic system of a helicopter with the detailed results 
described as follows. 
5.1. Information collection 
a) Specify the system architecture, external entities and external interfaces 
The hydraulic system contains two main hydraulic subsystems (named A and B) and a cold backup C. 
Subsystem A and C provide pressure and flow for the left cavity of the rotor booster.  B is designed for 
the right. When A failed, C starts working. Subsystem A and B are powered by the engine. However, C 
relies on an electric machine. The system architecture, external entities, and interfaces are shown in Fig.6. 
Since C doesn’t work at first, its initial state is spare (configuration information). 
 
Hydraulic
system A
Hydraulic
system C
Hydraulic
system B
Engine
Electric
Machine
Left
Rotor
Booster
Right
Rotor
Booster
Hydraulic System
Hydraulic pressure
Hydraulic pressure
Engine
power
Electric
power
 
Fig. 6  Hydraulic systems Architecture 
b) Build the function tree to specify the functions and services to model 
The function tree is translated into Table1.  According to the FHA results [9], A, B and C failed to 
provide hydraulic pressure and flow are a catastrophic event. That’s, all functions in Tables 2 have to be 
modelled. 
Table 1 Function tree of the hydraulic system 
Function of Level 1 Functions of Level 2 Functions of Level 3 
providing pressure and flow for the  
rotor booster 
providing pressure and flow for the 
left cavity of the rotor booster 
providing pressure and flow from A 
providing pressure and flow from C 
providing pressure and flow for the 
right cavity of the rotor booster 
providing pressure and flow from B 
 
c) Specify system breakdown structure 
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According to the decomposition method in Chapter 3, the hydraulic system is decomposed as shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2 the breakdown level of the hydraulic system 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Hydraulic 
system 
Sub-system A 
Oil tank 
Pump 
Assembled valves 
Pipe 
Sub-system B … 
Sub-system C …. 
Providing pressure and flow for the  rotor 
booster 
Providing pressure and flow for the 
left cavity of the rotor booster 
Providing pressure and flow for the 
right cavity of the rotor booster 
External power 
source 
Engine Engine 
Electric machine Electric machine 
Rotor booster 
Left cavity of the rotor booster Left cavity of the rotor booster 
Right cavity of the rotor booster Right cavity of the rotor booster 
 
d) Analysis the functions and services to be modeled 
Taking providing pressure and flow for the left cavity of the rotor booster from A as an example, the 
function flow diagram is built in Fig.7. Through function and failure analysis, one can specify elementary 
blocks, their inputs and outputs and physical failure states as well as the output polynomials. 
 
Oil tank AssembledValvesPump Pipe
Providing
pressure and
flow for the left
cavity of the
rotor booster
Providing
Oil
Providing
pressure
and flow
Distributing
pressure
and flow
 
Fig. 7  Function flow of Sub-system A 
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Table 3 Function analysis and failure analysis results 
Elementary 
block 
Physical 
state itself 
Input function (and state) Output function (and state) Output polynomial 
Tank Leak üü Providing oil (normal, failed) And 
Pump Stuck 
Cracked 
Providing oil (normal, 
failed) 
Providing hydraulic pressure 
and flow (normal, no-pressure, 
low-pressure, high-temperature, 
etc.) 
The polynomial 
should be described 
for each abnormal 
output function state. 
Assembled 
valves 
Leak Providing hydraulic 
pressure and flow (no-
pressure, low-pressure, 
high-temperature, etc.) 
Distributing pressure and flow 
(normal, no-pressure, low-
pressure, high-temperature, 
etc.) 
The polynomial 
should be described 
for each abnormal 
output function state. 
Pipe Broken Distributing pressure and 
flow (normal, no-pressure, 
low-pressure, high-
temperature, etc.) 
Transmitting pressure and flow 
(normal, no-pressure, low-
pressure, high-temperature, 
etc.) 
The polynomial 
should be described 
for each abnormal 
output function state. 
5.2. Model construction 
Construct the model from the top level to the third level. In this case, the Simfia toolsets provided by 
EADS APSYS were adopted. The partial model is shown in Fig.8. 
 
   
Fig. 8 The hydraulic model with a hierarchical structure 
5.3. Model V&V 
In this case, “Sub-system B can‘t provide pressure and flow” was taken as a top event to generate a 
fault tree as shown in Fig.9. Through validation the correctness of this fault tree by relevant system 
designers, the correctness of this model is verified correct partially. 
 
Fig. 9 Fault tree of “System B can‘t provide pressure and flow” 
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6. Conclusion 
A practical safety modelling methodology for aircraft systems is proposed in this paper. The 
information necessary to build a complete and correct model, the model construction process and model 
V&V methods are specified as well as the rules and constraints. The methodology could normalize the 
safety modelling process and enhance the model readability, correctness and completeness. In order to 
improve model management and enhance the reusability and modification capacity, the management 
based on a shared database is also discussed in this paper. In the following research, the modelling 
differences among different aircraft systems would be studied according to their own characteristics. And 
more attention should be paid on how to systematically create a more structured sharing database and 
make use of it more efficiently. 
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